23
Examples from lead in petrol debates
4. Ultimately accepting the science but denying its implications for
the issue – ‘Even if the science demonstrates measurable effects, it’s
not actually causing any damage.’
“It was misleading at best and fraudulent at worst to talk about the
symptoms and horrors of lead poisoning. That is just like talking about
the horrors of gassing World War I soldiers with chlorine at a hearing as
to whether we should chlorinate to purify drinking water.” Blanchard
cited by Stein 1982 in Needleman 2000.
5. Resisting change on the basis of no alternatives, cost etc. – ‘Even
if there is demonstrated damage, then we just have to live with
it because there are no alternatives; it’s too difficult/expensive to
change etc.’
“Even when there was subsequently evidence for adverse impacts on
children froma longitudinal study in New Zealand, this appeared to have
little or no impact on the policy process.” Wilson and Horrocks 2008.
“The amount of extra lead we get from pollution by exhaust gases is
comparatively very small. I accept that we should be better without
it, but if we do without it we have to use a lower octane petrol; we
therefore have to have lower compression engines. These factors bring
other problems in their wake. It is a matter of economics and sense.”
Lord Mowbray and Stoughton 1971.
6. Once change is inevitable, rapid acceptance by interest groups
and denial that there was any problem – ‘Not sure what all the fuss
was about as it’s quite possible to produce cars than run on unleaded
petrol; guns that use non-toxic shot; angling tackle that use non-toxic
weights etc .’
“On January 1 [1976] the legal limit of lead in petrol in Germany was
reduced to 0.15 grams per litre, well below that which the DoE accept
British industry cannot reasonably be asked to go. ... Oil companies
throughout the world have been unanimous on the perils of what
Germany has done. These are:
...
(5) Excessive wear and tear. Unlikely. German petrol companies are
now fervent in their assurances to motorists that the new petrol will
not harm their engines as they once were in their threat that it would.”
Ottaway and Terry 1976.
It is clear that making faster progress to eliminate the risk
to wildlife from lead would benefit from more insight into
behavioural change theories and the use of more sophisticated
ways of ‘selling’ the need for change to stakeholders. This
will help move the understanding and behaviour of people
(including both the public and those with influence in decision/
policy making processes).
In this regard, the ‘invisible’ nature of lead poisoning of
wildlife, with affected animals seldom being seen by the
public, unfortunately reinforces resistance to what is seen as
unnecessary change. Lead is not a ‘spectacular’ cause of death
in the way that acute episodes of oil pollution are, even though
lead poisoning has likely killed orders of magnitudes more
waterbirds than have marine oil spills.
As noted above, a wide range of international multi-lateral
environmental agreements have now formally recognised the
need to ban the use of lead gunshot in wetlands. Whilst, until
recent years, this international recognition has been largely
restricted to the African-Eurasian region, the acknowledgement
by 120 Parties to CMS of the global nature of the issue in 2014
was a major step forward. The call by CMS COP 11 to Parties
to “Phase-out the use of lead ammunition across all habitats
(wetland and terrestrial) with non-toxic alternatives within the
next three years…” is ambitious indeed. It will be important
to make rapid progress to this end to avoid prolonging the
unnecessary poisoning of wildlife.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Grateful thanks to Julia Newth, Ailsa Benton, Rachel Stroud
and Chris Spray for, variously, the supply of literature and
constructive comments on the draft, and to Ruth Cromie for
discussions. The views expressed are those of the author alone.
Regulation of some sources of lead poisoning