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3. Welfare organisations: who, over time, would need to
intervene and treat fewer poisoned individual animals.
4. Those at risk of lead poisoning: fewer health impacts for
frequent game consumers, including children and pregnant
women; and wildlife.
5. Wider environment: less lead getting into soils and
subsequently plants/invertebrates etc.
The main costs of the transition would be borne by :
1. The shooting community e.g.if necessary, proofing of
existing shotguns for steel shot, or possible new shotguns
or more expensive shot types for very old valuable guns;
increased cost of non-lead bullets or possibly new rifles
in some circumstances. Arguably these costs are partially
offset by the costs of not changing on risks to public image,
game markets and potential of the polluter being asked to
pay for contamination.
Costs to ammunition manufacturers of a reduction in sales of
lead ammunition are likely to be offset by income from sales of
non-toxic ammunition.
CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED
Given the evidence from human and ecosystem health science
on impacts of lead ammunition, possible restrictions on the
sale export/import of game meat containing elevated lead
levels, and further policy developments on lead ammunition
(including CMS Resolution 11.15), it is clear that the direction of
travel of this issue is leading to a phase out of lead ammunition.
To date, however, attempts by the conservation and shooting
communities respectively to persuade shooters of the problem
of lead poisoning and to comply with the existing law have not
worked (as illustrated in part by the results contained herein).
The issue of the risks from lead ammunition has been lost to
some extent in the complexities of various sociological barriers
and the politicisationof the problem. Indeed, the lessons learned
probably differ little to other conflict resolution situations
(Newth et al. 2015, Redpath et al. 2015) and include:
1. A need for facilitated processes beginning with a focus on
shared objectives - in this case broader conservation goals
of healthy (numerically and physiologically) populations of
native British quarry species;
2. Ensuring the sound evidence base is shared and interpreted
and tailored for specific audiences;
3. Insufficient effort has been made to maintain healthy
channels of communication between the shooting and
conservation communities with a dedication to openness
and constructive discourse and development of trust and
mutual understanding;
4. Trusted voices from the middle ground with an
understanding of both aspects of the conflict have been
largely missing from the issue;
5. Addressing one area of conflict within a landscape of other
tensions is particularly complex.
The Lead Ammunition Group represents an ambitious
participatory stakeholder process which judging by the
minutes of the meetings19 managed to cover a broad range
of issues in great detail and provided an opportunity for
responding to a number of the lessons learned. It is perhaps
unfortunate that some of the stakeholders have left that
process prior to the arguably more important government-
determined next steps (Lead Ammunition Group 2015,
Swift 2015).
Although the shooter may deposit the lead, this is in many
ways not the actual root of the issue. It would be more than
patronising to paint the shooter in the field as some sort of
innocent in this piece (given the strong feelings lead often/
usually produces) but behind them lie powerful sources
of resistance to change. In addition to issues of tradition
and politicisation, these include perceived or real financial
impacts for ammunition manufacturers, the driven game
shooting industry and the funding and economics of the
shooting organisations.
At the time of writing the Lead Ammunition Group has
reported to government and decisions are now political
(Swift 2015). Perhaps the debate is so polarised that the
shooting community knows that imposition of restrictions
is more likely than an acceptance of change and leadership
from within. It is hoped that leadership from the shooting
organisations or wider community (or another as yet
unidentified trusted third party) may emerge yet. This is
arguably preferable to the alternative of the issue shifting
into a broader public debate.
19
Sociological and political barriers to transition to non-toxic ammuntion: UK experience